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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
In addition
Smithfield

to the

Livestock

issues described

Auction

considers

in the
the

brief of CSB,

following

issues

relevant to this appeal:
1.

Does the printed statement on the back of the Smithfield

check constitute a restrictive endorsement?
2.

Is

Smithfield

CSB

by

estopped

reason

from

of

its

bringing

delay

and

this

action against

liquidation of other

collateral without notice to Smithfield?
3.
has

By a policy of allowing intermittent sales of livestock,

CSB

waived

its

lien

on

intermittent

cattle

sales

at

Smithfield?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Smithfield acquiesces in the statement of

the case

made by

CSB with the following corrections.
CSB states

in its

brief that

upon default of the Erickson

loan in April of 1983, CSB repossessed and sold the various items
of

collateral

success.

See

and

attempted

Brief

of

to

locate

Appellant

at

the livestock with no
3.

Following

this

introduction, the statement is made that:
[F]ollowing sale of the collateral, a deficiency balance
remained. CSB subsequently learned of the fact of the
livestock sale and brought its suit on April 29, 1985,
claiming damages for conversion against Smithfield.
Id.

That statement is substantially erroneous.

The evidence was

that CSB learned in the spring of 1983 that some of the cattle of
Erickson had been sold through Smithfield.
1

Reporter's Transcript

at

64-66.

The

statement

in Appellant's brief misstates this

critical item of evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts cited by CSB
substantial and

are

critical facts

correct

as

forming a

Findings of Fact are not stated nor fully
reason

Smithfield

provides

additional

stated.

However,

basis for the court's
documented.

statement

For this

of

fact

to

supplement those provided in the brief of CSB.
1.

There was

Smithfield were

a lack

the same

of evidence

that the

cattle sold by

cattle upon which CSB had a lien.

The

trial court in reviewing this evidence stated:
"Whose livestock it was we can assume and I would certainly
guess that certainly a portion of it or a good portion of it
was probably Mr. Ericksons, but I would be speculating to
say that all of the cattle of this amount of money was
cattle of Mr. Erickson's upon which there was a lien.
I
don't know that.
I have to assume it. There is good
circumstantial evidence that certainly part of it was, and
maybe a major portion of it was, but I don't know how much.
So I would have to speculate to come up with that exact
figure."
Reporter's Transcript at page 106, lines 7-16.
2.

Plaintiff's own

the endorsement
regarded

by

on

CSB

the
as

21-22.

back

a

Transcript at page 54,

witness, Dennis Yeates, indicated that
side

of

restrictive

lines 5-12,

Smithfield's

endorsement.
lines 22-25;

check was
Reporter's

page 57, lines

He indicated that as an experienced bank officer he would

accept it as such.
endorsement
credit would

it

He

would

be given

also

testified

reguire

special

on the

check.

that

because

handling

of this

by CSB before

Reporter's Transcript at

2

i

page 49,

line 25

60, line

1;

to page

page

required that

61,

50, line 22? page 59, line 23 to page

lines

an officer

16-24.

This

would have

special procedure

to approve the granting of

credit thereon under the then current bank procedures*
portion

of

sufficiently

the

Reporter's

critical

Smithfield that

and

Transcript

illustrative

Id.

(pages
of

the

This

46-64)

is

defense

of

it has been copied and attached to this brief as

Appendix #1.
3.

CSB elected to grant credit to Erickson in

account for

each check deposited and made no effort to offset or

inquire regarding the livestock sale shown
the source

of the

proceeds.

known of its own lien
checks were

his checking

it*

have been

That Plaintiff knew or should have

position

presented to

thereon to

on

livestock

at

the

time the

Reporter's Tranacript at page 55,

lines 15-19; page 57, lines 2-10.
4.
in the

That Plaintiff had a

regular procedure

of acquiescence

sale of livestock even though the same were liened in the

event the herd size remained the same.

Reporter's Transcript at

pages 33-39, pages 41-45.
5.

That Plaintiff pursuant to this policy would not object

and would acquiesce in Ericksonfs sale of livestock
time and

did not

require borrowers

permission when selling small
cows.

numbers

such as
of

from time to

Erickson to obtain

livestock

or culling

The Plaintiff only required its release to be given in the

event of a bulk sale of the livestock covered by the lien.

3

Id.

6.

That

bankruptcy

Plaintiff

discharge

filed

of

which

might

notice in

the Spring

against

any claim

was presented
the

check

to the

No

court.

payments

to

that

litigation, the

in

fact, had

of checks to Erickson for sale of

to Defendant

lawsuit several years later.

the

pursued

Plaintiff,

livestock through Defendant's auction.
notice of

of

to the

Defendant or even notice to

bankruptcyof 1983

objecting

Plaintiff

Defendant

arise

Defendant of Erickson's

complaint

Erickson.

litigation without notice to
claims

a

Yet

Plaintiff

gave no

until the institution of this
reason for

the lack

of notice

Plaintiff admitted full notice of

Erickson

by

Defendant.

Reporter's

Transcript at 65-67.
7.

Plaintiff proceeded

to liquidate

the loan, enter into releases of
verifiable explanations
the

presentation

of

Reporter's Transcript

collateral to

and otherwise
any

claim

for

at pages 67-75.

to the court that the liquidations
at fair

market value.

Id.

other collateral for
Erickson without

settle the matter without
deficiency

to Defendant.

No evidence was presented

were conducted

reasonably or

Plaintiff also admitted it released

collateral to Erickson for less than appraised value.
also admitted

it made

of the livestock or

Plaintiff

no bona fide effort to locate the balance

significant pieces

of equipment.

All this

was done without notice of claim of any kind to Defendant.
8.

The

activities

collateral without
claim

and

further

of

Plaintiff

notifying Defendant
under

the

of the

procedures
4

in

liquidating

Id.
the

possibility of a

exercised, factually

supports the legal defense

of waiver

Reporter1s

and estoppel.

Transcript at pages 106-108.
9.

That even

after the

own procedures there was
March 14, 1985.
10.
receiving

a deficiency

of only

$15,919.66 as of

Reporter's Transcript at page 103.

That
the

Plaintiff's liguidation under its

Plaintiff

checks

and

waited
two

almost

years

three

after

years

its

after

knowledge of

Erickson's default to present any claim to Defendant.

CITATION OF RELEVANT LAW
In addition to the law cited by CSB in its brief, Smithfield
relies upon the following statutes in support of its arguments:
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-203
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-206
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-304
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-4Q6
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 70A-3-603(1)(b)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents conflicting
actual notice.

the

defenses.

of

constructive and

The trial court1s decision is factually based on

a unique set of circumstances.
whole

issues

trial

court

Further, the

found

From that
waiver

court found

conversion.

5

amalgam of

facts as a

and estoppel to be valid

a lack

of evidence proving

I.

THE SMITHFIELD CHECKS CONTAIN A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT.

The

endorsement

is

both

restrictive

and

conditional

especially where CSB is the accepting Bank.
II. SECTION 70A-4-203 REQUIRES THAT CSB COMPLY
RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT OF THE SMITHFIELD CHECK.
By the

clear terms

with it by releasing
70A-4-203

of the

its lien

specifically

WITH THE

endorsement CSB either complied

or violated

exempts

its terms.

Section

its protection when restrictive

endorsements are involved.

While there might be some question if

an

were

innocent

third

party

involved, CSB cannot claim such

protection.
III.

CSB FAILED TO PROVE CONVERSION BY SMITHFIELD.

CSB failed to document that the cows sold were liened to it.
Furthermore, CSB

had a policy of allowing the very type of sales

done by Smithfield.
IV.
AND ITS
CLAIM.

CSB'S FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY SMITHFIELD OF ITS CLAIM
HAPHAZARD HANDLING OF OTHER COLLATERAL ALSO BARS ITS

CSB without regard to
other

collateral.

liquidate in

CSB's

a commercially

the interests
failure

of Smithfield released

to notify Smithfield and to

reasonable manner

is an additional

bar to recovery.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SMITHFIELD CHECKS CONTAIN A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT.
The checks

that were

issued by the Defendant to William C.

Erickson contained on the back side thereof the following printed
endorsement instructions:
6

i

"In executing my endorsement of this check I do sell to the
Smithfield Livestock Auction, Inc., the herein described
Livestock and guarantee that I am the owner of said
Livestock and that said Livestock are clear of all mortgage
liens or
encumbrances.
If Livestock are mortgaged,
mortgagee's endorsement or release of mortgage is required.
Please endorse below.ff
Exhibit 5. (Emphasis added).
Clearly the
mortgaged

instructions require

that

alternatively

the
that

mortgagee

a

must

release

of

mortgagee is Commercial Security
that a

mortgagee endorsement

are mortgaged.
mortgage

An

might

be

mortgage

Bank.

bank

to

case Commercial

and was

certainly on

check.

The

of

is

check

required.

The check

or
The

states on it

in the event the cows

which

is

unaware

were mortgaged.

Security Bank

notice of

testimony

the

of the

circumvent that restriction by not

having actual knowledge that the cows
in this

endorse

is required

accepting
able

that if the livestock are

itself held the mortgage

the restrictions

their

However,

stated on the

own bank officer was that an

endorsement restriction such as that contained on the back of the
Smithfield checks
officer.
would

A bank

have

to

would require
officer

conclude

clearance by

reading
that

this

if

the

a particular bank

restrictive endorsement
bank

itself

endorsement by accepting these funds and paying out
are

essentially

thereon.

Mr.

guaranteeing
Yeates,

the

their
bank's

had

that

on them they

own endorsement or release
own

witness

and

officer

explained this situation succinctly:
Q
And an individual writes a check to Wilson Motor,
$3,000, for a new car and puts on that check, ,fThis check is
payment in full for all liens and encumbrances on automobile
such-and-such,'1 and then Wilson Motor endorses that check
7

and wants to deposit it in your bank, and you know the bank
has a lien on their car. What would the teller do? Is that
a restrictive endorsement?
A
That's correct.
Q
What should the teller do?
A
Well, I would think she would normally take it to
an officer, if you're talking about an automobile for a
check that size, she'd take to an officer.
Q
Why?
A
For protection.
Q
For protection for who?
A
For the bank.
Q
For the bank. Because the bank, by accepting that
check, depositing it and then using it, as a collecting bank
may release any lien it has on Wilson's Automobile; right?
A
That's correct.
Reporter's Transcript at page 49, lines 4-24.
Even

if

the

court

were

to

restrictive endorsement, the bank
the instrument
course of

was actually

its negotiation

consider

this

other than a

officer's testimony

handled or

by Commercial

as to how

would be handled in the
Security Bank provides

significant evidence that the Bank would be a knowing participant
in allowing

this

endorsement or

check

to

be

cashed

release relative

without

an appropriate

to the livestock sold.

CSB is contributorily negligent in

allowing

its

own

At best

debtor to

pass such an endorsement through CSB and obtain funds thereon.

POINT II
SECTION 70A-4-203 REQUIRES THAT CSB COMPLY WITH
THE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT OF THE SMITHFIELD CHECK.
CSB

argues

that

Section

70A-4-203

Security Bank from any notice or
the restrictive

endorsement.

exempts

Commercial

responsibility with

respect to

A careful reading of that Section

does exactly the opposite for it states specifically that it is
8

(

"subject to the provisions
of
Article
3 concerning
conversion of
the instrument (Section 3-419) and the
provisions of both Article 3 and this article concerning
restrictive endorsements . . .ff
Section 70A-4-203

(Emphasis added).

CSB subject to compliance

with

proceeds

the

to

argue

that

agreement between Smithfield
Erickson, the
effect on

debtor.

the

Clearly this Section makes

restrictive
endorsement

Livestock

restrictive endorsement

bank.

instructions

Auction

Further, that

collecting

endorsements.

such an

However,

indicates the

and

the checks.

restrictive

endorsement is
other

banks

it is

endorsement.
binding upon

dealing

with

position because of their

William C.

a

reading

opposite.

of the

It requires of
have certain

Commercial Security Bank by accepting

the check and paying out on
the

are an

agreement has no

any parties who receive and pay out funds that they
signatures on

CSB

acknowledging compliance with

The

CSB.

conditional

nature of the

Smithfield acknowledges that

these

documents

lack of

are in a different

actual knowledge

of the lien

against these cattle.
Based

on

the

trial court, it was
passing through

particular

set

proper

hold

is

the

Bank's

especially

to

proceed .against

appropriate

given

the Defendant.

the fact that CSB's own

officer testified that this type of an endorsement
special

handling

activities in

this restrictive endorsement constitute a waiver

and estoppel of their right
This

to

of circumstances before the

by

their

Bank.

handling would require permission from

Further,
an

would require

that the special

officer

of

the bank

before a teller would be authorized to accept such a check.
9

It is

problematic how

bank when those proceeds
which is

now claiming

one could

convert proceeds due to a

are deposited
conversion.

to the

very institution

The Bank chose to allow Mr.

Erickson to draw money out of his checking account.
Bank

chose

Erickson.

to

honor

When

Mr.

Commercial Security
proceeds from

its

the

position

Erickson

Bank, the
sales

Smithfield Livestock

of

as

being

deposited

the

whatever

Auction.

cows

were

Erickson then

argument

money

but

more

succinctly

didn't

was a creditor of
For the Bank to

stated

is

that it

know that it was receiving the

to draw

Further that had the

those funds

back out

of the

Given the fact that the check actually passed through the

Bank's own hands, had a restrictive
to sale

at the

that it was receiving funds for the cows it would not

have allowed Mr. Erickson
Bank.

sold

The Bank did receive the funds.

money for the cows that it had a lien upon.
bank known

with

it did not receive the funds flies in the face of the

Bank's

received

funds

Bank actually received all of the

depositor/checking relationship.
The

a debtor of Mr.

these

the Bank to the amount remaining in his account.
argue that

That is, the

of livestock

endorsement on

it referring

and release of livestock liens, it appears

appropriate that the Bank should be estopped from now asserting a
complete lack

of knowledge

on its

part.

One could consider a

comparison between Smithfieldfs constructive notice of a U.C.C.

10

(

filing against Erickson's cows with the

actual knowledge

of the

Bank and its officers regarding the source of these funds.
The

trial

court's

dismissal

of

Plaintiff's Complaint is

properly based upon those evidentiary determinations.

The brief

of the Appellant in this matter attempts to tie the trial court's
ruling solely to the legal issues
restrictive endorsement

by collecting banks.

court in this matter based its
endorsement law,

regarding the

but upon

decision not

significant and

handling of the

However, the trial
only on restrictive

peculiar and factual

determinations in this unusual situation.

POINT III
CSB FAILED TO PROVE CONVERSION BY SMITHFIELD.
In significant

respects,

CSB

failed

evidence on its conversion complaint.

to

provide adequate

The trial court found that

CSB failed to prove definitively that the cows sold by Smithfield
Livestock Auction
which CSB

had a

were cows

belonging to the Plaintiff and upon

proper lien

significant evidence

position.

Furthermore, there was

introduced by CSB's own witness that it had

a policy of allowing sale of cull cows and sale of cows
lots without assertion of its lien position.
indicated that
lien

upon

the

CSB viewed
herd

than

a livestock
a

in small

Plaintiff's witness

lien more

lien on each cow.

as a floating
Mr. Yeates, an

officer of CSB, testified that CSB did not expect the proceeds of
cow sale
same.

to go to the Bank so long as the herd size remained the

That is,

they specifically
11

allowed farmers

to sell cull

cows and

other cows

from time

to time as long as the herd size

remained approximately the same.

Reporter's

Transcript at page

41, line 19 to page 45, line 4.
Q
Okay.
But what I'm saying is, did you object to
this man as a regular part of his dairy and steer operation
selling cows as long as your herd remained the same size?
A
As long as it remained the same size, you would
have no objection
Reporter's Transcript at page 41, lines 19-23.
Q
Okay, let me go through it again.
In July Mr.
Erickson is current, he's made you your $2,000 payment twice
a month. He'll make the one the next month and the next
month and so forth. But in July he takes three cows out of
his herd, cull cows, takes them over to Smithfield Livestock
Auction, has them sold, and gets an $1,100 check, puts it in
his bank account. Do you expect that $1,100?
A
Did he replace the cows?
Q
Assume that he did. Do you expect the $1,100?
A
If he replaced them, no.
Q
Okay. So your really regard it as a floating lien
on the herd and not a lien on specific cows; is that right?
A
That's correct.
Reporter's Transcript at page 44, lines 12-24.
It should

be noted

that the type of sales that occurred through

Smithfield were of this

nature.

and knowledge

cows were

were

coming

endorsement on

that the
into

their

own

CSB also

had full opportunity

being sold

small

bank

because the funds

with

a

restrictive

them showing that they were for the sale of cows.

This is a process

that went

on for

three or

four months

small portion of the cattle were being sold a few at a time.
has never made any effort to account for the balance
or for

their sale

in bulk.

as a
CSB

of the herd

CSB has not even indicated that the

debtor was asked.

12

I

POINT IV
CSBfS FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY SMITHFIELD OF ITS CLAIM AND
ITS HAPHAZARD HANDLING OF OTHER COLLATERAL ALSO BARS ITS
CLAIM.
CSB failed to
within

a

advise

reasonable

Smithfield

time

some were

this

potential claim

CSB received Smithfield1s

period.

checks in the summer of 1982.
and that

of

CSB knew that the cattle were gone

sold through Smithfield.

No claim was filed

against Smithfield nor was any notice given until April 26, 1985.
Smithfield
interest.

was

thereby

prevented

Instead, CSB litigated

Bankruptcy Court
seek to come
collateral and

and only

against

from

with

the

after losing

Smithfield.

protecting
debtor

its

own

Erickson in

that case did they then

CSB

also

liquidated other

failed to reasonably marshal those assets or care

for them in a husbandlike manner.

CSB simply seeks to demand the

difference from Smithfield.
Q
What you're attempting to sue my clients for is
some residual loss you claim on this loan; correct?
A
Thatfs correct.
Q
So your disposition of all the collateral and your
stewardship of it reflects on how much they may be damaged
here.
A
That's correct.
Q
So if you let go of certain kinds of collateral
for much less than it was worth, it would increase their
damage and liability, wouldn't it?
A
That would be a correct assumption.
Q
Particularly after you knew that they might be
liable.
Don't you think you ought to notify them that they
might be liable so they can make an effort to protect
themselves?
A
Well, their consideration into their liability
didn't come—came several years later, so that wasn't even a
thought.
Reporter's Transcript at page 72, line 11 to page 73, line 3. In
several cases, CSB documented

that it
13

still had

liens on other

collateral or

released them

without any

accounting of what was

done with the collateral.
Q
Did you ever inquire as to what he did with the
4010 tractor?
A
No.
Q
Who did he sell it to?
A
I can't tell you.
Q
Do you know what he sold it for?
A
He told me fifteen-Q
I'm not interested in what he told you. How much
was it sold for?
A
I know it was sold for $lr500.
Q
Did you agree to the release?
A
Yes.
Reporter's Transcript at page 69, lines 1-12.
Q
Okay. Does that refresh your recollection?
A
Yes.
Q
Of what you consider the value of that tractor to
be?
A
Yes.
Q
What was the value?
A
At that time, (6/8/82) $8,000.
Reporter's Transcript

at page

70, lines 4-10, (insert of date-

reference to Reporter's Transcript at page 9, lines 5-10.
Q
Did you ever get a name of who this tractor might
be sold to?
A
We attempted.
Q
Was it Mr. Jeppson of Malad, Idaho?
A
I couldn't tell you. We didn't find out.
Q
I want to give you this note that you say was made
at the time of the loan again and ask you to read the bottom
paragraph, see if that refreshes your recollection.
A
Okay.
Q
You did acguire information of who the tractor was
sold to?
A
Right. Right.
Q
Did you call Mr. Jeppson in Malad and ask him?
A
Unable to find him.
Q
what effort did you make?
A
I can't recall.
Q
Your handwritten notes say, "Mr. Erickson would
not give the bank the name of Mr. Jeppson to verify that it
was a bonafide sale." Is that correct?
A
That's correct.
14
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Q
What do you mean, it wouldn't give the name of Mr.
Jeppson?
A
It wouldn't give us a first name.
Q
Okay.
So you made no effort to determine which
Jeppson it was in Malad?
A
I can't recall. It's too long ago.
Q
Do you know whether there was a bonafide sale?
A
It seems, and like I say I can't remember the
details, you know—well, all I know is that he gave me a
check for $1,500 [before bankruptcy date—April 1983] and
said that the check represented the money he got from the
purchase.
Q
Is that tractor still liened with a U.C.C., or did
you release it?
A
I have no idea.
Reporter's Transcript at page 43, line 13 to page 74, line 21
(insert of date—reference to

Reporter's Transcript

at page 70,

line 24-25) .
In

this

one

example

effort at verification,

with

CSB

virtually

releases

a

no documentation or

tractor

it

valued at

$8,000 for $1,500 ten months after the loan was made. Inasmuch as
CSB

had

notice

Smithfield,

in

1982

thereafter

that

the

CSB

cattle

had

been

procedures to collect the loan

affected materially the financial interest of
activities in

failing to

detriment

Security Bank

of
had

Smithfield.
not

Smithfield.

reasonably marshall

release collateral without reasonable
the

sold through

CSB's

collateral and to

accounting

all

worked to

The court found that Commercial

demonstrated

that

it

had

acted

in a

commercially reasonable manner with respect to the liquidation of
collateral.
In other words, if they had sold all of the personal
property, the tractors and the real property and all of
that, and sold it and realized so that there was, say, only
5,000 left, they could only then foreclose on enough catele
to get the remaining five, and when they jeopardize that
amount or make the amount lower than it should be, I think
15

this casts some doubt, at least some doubt, so there should
be some estoppel at least as it concerns the amount.
Reporter's Transcript at page 107, line 19 through page 108, line
1.

This is an issue which is particularly critical to Smithfield

inasmuch as it

is

being

Commercial Security
subsequent factual

sued

Bank.

for

the

balance

This evidence

determination that

now

owing to

supported the court's

a waiver

or estoppel had

occurred.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment of dismissal should be sustained.
The activities
checks

from

of

Commercial

Smithfield

Security

Livestock

Bank

Auction

endorsement and crediting those to Erickson's
claims

against

operation of
Code,
within

but

Smithfield.

the specific

based

the

upon

office

of

That

actual

Commercial

accepting the

with

a restrictive

account estops its

estoppel arises not only by

provisions of

the

in

the Uniform Commercial

handling of the instruments
Security

Bank.

Officers

themselves reviewed these checks and allowed them to be deposited
in Ericksons account.
structure

of

the

Uniform

estoppel on the part
years

later

This activity even apart from the specific

of the

against

Commercial
Bank to

Smithfield.

evidence to justify a conclusion
permitted the

Code

gives

rise

to an

assert a* claim some three
There

that

the

is
Bank

also substantial
acquiesced and

occasional sales of livestock without assertion of

its lien position.

The subsequent dealings of CSB with

16

collateral also supports Smithfield defenses of

waiver, estoppel

and laches.
It should be noted that this case was dismissed by the trial
after presentation of Plaintiff's case in
not

yet

introduced

rebuttal

chief.

testimony.

The

Defendant has
most

that the

Plaintiff should obtain as relief by this Court would be a remand
to

the

trial

court

with instructions to proceed with rebuttal

evidence on the part of the Defendant.
DATED this (n

day of April, 1987.
DAINES & KANE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies,
one copy being manually signed by me, of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent this X
day of April, 1987 to the following:
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS
Assistant General Counsel
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
50 South Main Street
Suite 2011, CSB Tower
P.O. Box 30815
Salt Lake City, UT 84130
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chaser took subject to equities. Lebcher v.
Lambert (1900) 23 U 1, 63 P 628, citing
Norton on Bills and Notes; Pingree Nat. Bank
of Ogden v. McFarland (1921) 57 U 410,195 P
313.
* instrument
. „
*
Separate
Separate writing does not constitute an
indorsement where not attached to the note.
Ackerman v. Bramwell Inv. Co. (1932) 80 U
52, 12 P 2d 623, distinguished in 13 U 2d 256,
372 P 2d 346.
Even though there was no negotiation of a
note in accordance with the provisions of the

70A-3-204

Negotiable Instruments Law, this would not
prevent a legally effective transfer of rights
under the note and mortgage by a separate
instrument in writing. Continental Bank &
Trust Co. v. Cunningham (1960) 10 U 2d 329,
353 P 2d 168.
Typewritten indorsement.
Typewritten indorsement of check complied with former section 44-1-32. Pingree
Nat. Bank of Ogden v. McFarland (1921) 57 U
410,195 P 313.

70A-3-203. Wrong or misspelled name. Where an instrument is made
payable to a person under a misspelled name or one other Ithan his own
he may indorse in that name or his own or both; but signature in both
names may be required by a person paying or giving value for the instrument.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-203.
r-~,« nAfAMMAM
v/ross^rveierences*
.
.
. » . S n i£ u JiIt a P P e a r , n 8 o n instrument,
' '•
Collateral References.
Bills and Notes $=> 181,183.
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 204,208.
11 AmJur 2d 372, Bills and Notes § 352.

Construction and application of provision
* VT A* ti T A
AT
J*
of Negotiable Instruments Law regarding
e n d o r 8 e m e n t 0 f instrument by payee or
endorsee whose name is wrongly designated
or misspelled, 153 ALR 598.
Mistake in name in endorsement of check,
preventing payment thereof before failure of
drawee, 21 ALR 1556.

70A-3-204. Special indorsement — Blank indorsement.
(1) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom or to whose
order it makes the instrument payable. Any instrument specially
indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee and
may be further negotiated only by his indorsement.
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may
consist of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and
indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated
by delivery alone until specially indorsed.
(3) The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing over the signature of the indorser in blank any
contract consistent with the character of the indorsement.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-204.
Cross-Rcferences
\T ™ierence*'
Negotiation of instrument, 70A-3-202.

Collateral References.
Bills a n d Notes

* * 188 " 190 10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 212-214.
n
A m J u r 2 d 382, 423, Bills and Notes
§§360,361,395.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Effect of blank indorsement.

A note indorsed in blank is as though it
had been originally made payable to bearer.
Karren v. Bair (1924) 63 U 344, 225 P 1094.
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70A-3-205. Restrictive indorsements. An indorsement is restrictive
which either
(a) is conditional; or
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument; or
(c) includes the words "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any bank,"
or like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection; or
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the indorser or
of another person.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-205.

-

Cross-References.
Conversion of instruments, 70A-3-419,
70A-4-203.
Depositary bank taking item for collection
may supply missing indorsement, 70A-4-205.
Effect of restrictive indorsement,
70A-3-206.
Negotiation of instrument, 70A-3-202.
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304.

Payment or satisfaction of instrument,
70A-3-603.
Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <£» 190.
10 CJS Bills and Notes § 214.
11 AmJur 2d 384, Bills and Notes § 362.
Endorsement, "to the order of any bank or
banker," as a restrictive endorsement, 10
ALR 709.
Undertaking of one who endorses a note
without recourse, 2 ALR 216, 91 ALR 399.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Conditional delivery.
Indorsement of a note before delivery to
the payee may be conditional, but to be binding on the payee such conditions must be
accepted by him, made with notice to him or
knowledge on his part before or accompanying delivery, and these facts must be pleaded
and proved. Farmers' & Stockgrowers' Bank
v. Pahvant Valley Land Co. (1917) 50 U 35,
165 P 462.
Effect of recitals in deposit slip.

Where check is deposited at a bank, the
deposit slip of which contains usual recitals
that such bank acts merely as the agent for
collection, and not as a purchaser thereof,
title to check does not pass to said bank; nor
does fact that the drawee bank credited bank
of deposit with the check in controversy preclude depositor from prevailing as a preferred creditor upon the insolvency of latter
bank. Western Creamery Co. v. Malia (1936)
89 U 422, 57 P 2d 743, distinguished in 11 U
2d 89, 355 P 2d 210.

70A-3-206. Effect of restrictive indorsement.
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negotiation
of the instrument.
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the depositary
bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by a restrictive
indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate transferor
or the person presenting for payment.
(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transferee under an indorsement which is conditional or includes the words "for collection,"
"for deposit," "pay any bank," or like terms (subparagraphs (a) and
(c) of section 70A-3-205) must pay or apply any value given by him
for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the
indorsement and to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder
for value. In addition such transferee is a holder in due course if
he otherwise complies with the requirements of section 70A-3-302
on what constitutes a holder in due course.
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70A-3-207

The first taker under an indorsement for the benefit of the indorser
or another person (subparagraph (d) of section 70A-3-205) must pay
or apply any value given by him for or on the security of the instrument consistently with the indorsement and to the extent that he
does so he becomes a holder for value. In addition such taker is
a holder in due course if he otherwise complies with the require. ments of section 70A-3-302 on what constitutes a holder in due
course. A later holder for value is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by such restrictive indorsement unless he has knowledge that a fiduciary or other person has negotiated the instrument
in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of
duty (subsection (2) of section 70A-3-304).

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-206.

11 AmJur 2d 435, Bills and Notes § 408.

Cross-References.
Conversion of instrument, 70A-3-419,
70A-4-203.
Depositary bank taking item for collection
may supply missing indorsement, 70A-4-205.
Effect of discharge against holder in due
course, 70A-3-602.
Intermediary bank and payor bank, notice
from prior indorsement, 70A-3-102 (3),
70A-4-105, 70A-4-205.
Item indorsed "pay any bank," effect,
70A-4-201.
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304.
Payment or satisfaction of instrument,
70A-3-603.
Restrictive indorsements, 70A-3-205.
Rights of one not holder in due course,
70A-3-306.
„ „
.„ ,
Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <£=> 190, 199, 250, 290 et
seq.,330.
10 CIS Bills and Notes §§ 39, 214 et seq.,
220.

Endorsement "for deposit only" as affecting right of holder of paper against drawer
or maker who would have a good defense as
against payee, 75 ALR 1415.
Endorsement, 'To the order of any bank or
banker," as a restrictive endorsement, 10
ALR 709.
For deposit only, endorser's liability on
endorsement to original, or subsequent,
endorsee, 60 ALR 866.
Maker's endorsement of note payable to
himself without words of negotiability, 42
ALR 1067,50 ALR 426.
Sale or negotiation for value of commercial
paper after it has been endorsed by the
holder with a restrictive endorsement, as
waiver of the restriction so as to entitle the
purchaser to recover thereon as a holder in
due course, 149 ALR 318.
Law Reviews.
Restrictive Indorsement Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. Pittsburgh L.
Rev. 616.

70A-3-207. Negotiation effective although it may be rescinded.
(1) Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument although the
negotiation is
(a)
made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or
any other person without capacity; or
(b)
obtained by fraud, duress or mistake of any kind; or
(c)
part of an illegal transaction; or
(d)
made in breach of duty.
(2) Except as against a subsequent holder in due course such negotiation is in an appropriate case subject to recission, the declaration of a constructive trust or any other remedy permitted by law.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-207.

Cross-References.
Burden of establishing signatures, defenses
and due course, 70A-3-307.
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Preexisting indebtedness was a sufficient
consideration for maker's obligation under
note. Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land
Co. (1938) 94 U 76,75 P 2d 660.
Preexisting debt furnished value for
indorsement of note by payee to another.
Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co.
(1938) 94 U 76,75 P 2d 660.
The extinguishment of a preexisting, valid
debt is a sufficient consideration for a check.
Great American Indemnity Co. v. Berryessa
(1952) 122 U 243,248 P 2d 367.
What constitutes consideration.
Where cashier and president of bank
agreed to put up certain amounts of money
to make up loss which bank had sustained,
and avert ruin with which institution was
threatened, and defendant cashier executed
note and president advanced cash, held,
execution of note was based on sufficient consideration to support action by bank on note.
Utah Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Nelson
(1910) 38 U 169, 111 P 907.
Promise to pay debt from which promisor
has been discharged in bankruptcy is suffi-

cient consideration for note. Merchants' Bank
v. Goodfellow (1914) 44 U 349, 140 P 759;
Merchants' Protective Assn. v. Popper (1922)
59 U 470,204 P 107.
The consideration need not be cash; checks
are the equivalent. Payment may consist of
anything constituting a valid consideration
of sufficient value. Miller v. Marks (1914) 46
U 257,148 P 412.
Extension of time by payee is sufficient
consideration. Assets Realization Co. v.
Cardon (1928) 72 U 597,604,272 P 204.
Where wife owned substantial interest in
joint bank account, and husband executed
note to wife at her request upon withdrawing
substantial sum from such account to invest
in hazardous business, and when it became
due husband executed renewal note secured
by mortgage on undivided one-half interest
in property owned by them jointly, original
note was supported by valuable consideration, and hence, mortgage was not fraudulent
as to creditors. Williams v. Peterson (1935)
86 U 526,46 P 2d 674.

70A-3-304. Notice to purchaser.
(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a)
the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence
of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call
into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an
ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b)
the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is
voidable in whole or in part, or that all parties have been
discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when
he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument
in payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction
for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty.
(3) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has
reason to know
(a)
that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that
there is an uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b)
that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c)
that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has
been made or more than a reasonable length of time after
its issue. A reasonable time for a check drawn and payable
within the states and territories of the United States and the
District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty days.
(4) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim
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70A-3-304

that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory
promise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the
purchaser has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from
the terms thereof;
that any party has signed for accommodation;
(c)
that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless
(d)
the purchaser has notice of any improper completion;
that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fidu(e)
ciary;
that there has been default in payment of interest on the
(f)
instrument or in payment of any other instrument, except
one of the same series.
The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute
notice within the provisions of this chapter to a person who would
otherwise be a holder in due course.
To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such
manner as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
(a)
(b)

(5)

(6)

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-304.

Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas (1967) 20 U
2d 100,433 P 2d 605.

Cross-References.
Alteration of instrument, 70A-3-407.
Effect of discharge against holder in due
course, 70A-3-602.
Holder in due course, 70A-3-302.
Notice to person or organization,
70A-1-201.
Other writings affecting instrument,
70A-3-119.
"Presumption" defined, 70A-1-201 (31).
Promise or order, when unconditional,
70A-3-105.
Restrictive indorsement, effect of,
70A-3-206.
Transfer, right to indorsement, 70A-3-201.
Duty of purchaser.
To impose upon one who is offered commercial paper the duty of inquiring in each
instance whether obligations have been satisfactorily performed by prior holders would so
burden such transactions as to create
insuperable impedimenta to the free
exchange of negotiable paper, which is an
indispensable part of modern business.
Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas (1967) 20 U
2d 100, 433 P 2d 605.
Presumption of good faith.
In the absence of anything to warn him to
the contrary one who takes a negotiable
instrument as a holder in due course may
assume that persons with whom he deals are
themselves acting honestly and in good faith.

Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <3=> 332 et seq.
10 CJS Bills and Notes § 321 et seq.
11 AmJur 2d 453, Bills and Notes § 424 et
seq.
Addition of word indicating representative
or fiduciary capacity after name of payee,
endorser, or endorsee on commercial paper as
charging transferee with notice of trust in
favor of third parties or of defenses in
maker, 61 ALR 1389.
Endorsement without recourse as affecting
character of endorsee or subsequent holder
as holder in due course, 77 ALR 487.
High rate of discount on sale as affecting
status as holder in due course, 91 ALR 1139.
Notation or memorandum on bill or note
as affecting one's character as holder in due
course, 34 ALR 1377.
Notation or memorandum on bill or note
as notice, 56 ALR 1373.
Notice which has been forgotten as affecting status as holder in due course, 89 ALR 2d
1330.
Public records as affecting one's character
as a holder in due course of negotiable paper,
37 ALR 860.
Renewal of note after notice of defense as
destroying bona fide character of holder, 35
ALR 1294.
Transferee of commercial paper given by
purchaser of chattel and secured by conditional sale, retention of title, or chattel mort-
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gage, as subject to defenses which chattel
purchaser could assert against seller, 44 ALR
2d 84.
What constitutes, under the uniform negotiable instruments law or commercial code, a

reasonable time for taking a demand instrument, so as to support the taker's status as
holder in due course, 10 ALR 3d 1199.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Former section 44-1-55, relating to notice
Burden of proof.
In action by indorsee on note defended by before full amount paid, was not intended to
maker on ground of partial failure of consid- have, nor did It have, any bearing on rights
eration between maker and payee, held bur- of an indorsee who received negotiable paper
den was on defendant to establish such before maturity in due course, and without
defense, and to show notice of plaintiff of notice of infirmities. All that section was
failure of consideration. Cole Banking Co. v. intended to accomplish was to limit the
Sinclair (1908) 34 U 454, 98 P 411,131 Am St indorsee's recovery to the amount he had
advanced before obtaining notice of some
Rep 885.
infirmity in the paper, and not to affect his
Demand note.
fundamental relation to the debtor. Felt v.
A demand note does not become overdue Bush (1912) 41 U 462,126 P 688.
note until lapse of reasonable time after
Under former section 44-1-55 an indorsee
indorsement. Idaho State Bank of Twin Falls, of a note who, in due course, and without
Idaho v. Hooper Sugar Co. (1929) 74 U 24, 276 notice of any defect therein, gave his check to
P 659, 68 ALR 969.
indorser in payment thereof, but before payment of check received notice of infirmity in
Duress.
the note, and check was duly paid, such
Note and mortgage executed by bank cash- indorsee acquired note in due course, without
ier and his wife under threats of criminal notice, and was not bound to stop payment of
prosecution, held properly annulled on check. Miller v. Marks (1914) 46 U 257,148 P
ground of duress. Payson Building & Loan 412.
Society v. Taylor (1935) 87 U 302, 48 P 2d 894.
Notice of breach of executory agreement.
Findings.
Notice of breach of terms of executory conA finding that indorsee of a note was inno- tract in pursuance of which note was given
cent purchaser for value, without knowledge does not affect bona fide purchaser without
of any defect in or defense to the note, and notice. Stephens v. Doxey (1921) 58 U 196,198
acted in good faith in the transaction, has P 261; Karren v. Bair (1924) 63 U 344, 225 P
been held to be sufficient, though in nature of 1094.
a conclusion. This is not, however, strictly in
Where negotiable note is consideration for
compliance with the Code respecting findings.
executory contract and note is negotiated
Miller v. Marks (1914) 46 U 257,148 P 412.
before the breach of the contract, breach of
contract is not a defense to note in hands of
Fraud.
Payee who obtains promissory note by holder in due course even if holder knew of
fraudulent representations and sale of the contract, since, for such defense to be
worthless animal to maker, and under oral available, holder must have known about the
agreement not to negotiate same, receives breach before purchasing the note. Karren v.
defective title thereto, but subsequent holder Bair (1924) 63 U 344,225 P 1094.
in due course may enforce same against Notice of claim or defense.
maker. Utah Bond & Share Co. v. Chappel
Transferee who came into possession of
(1926) 68 U 530, 251 P 354.
note with knowledge that it was fully
Plaintiff, a minor, was properly considered intended by makers that note should be held
a holder in due course of note given as a by trust company in escrow without delivery
result of dealings of plaintiffs father with
until makers were relieved of their obligation
defendant corporation, on which plaintiff
brought suit where delivery was made by a to pay another note, held not an innocent
party to the transaction resulting in the note, purchaser for value, and not entitled to
although not by the maker, where there was recover on note. De Garmo v. Kay (1918) 52 U
no showing of fraud in the transaction. 231,173 P 129.
In suit by corporation to cancel mortgage
Christensen v. Financial Service Co. (1963) 14
upon
ground that it was authorized by only
U 2d 101, 377 P 2d 1010, 2 ALR 3d 1144.
three of five directors constituting board of
directors, wherein it appeared that corporaNotice before full amount paid.
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tion had delivered note and mortgage to bank
which assigned to defendant stockholder for
value and before maturity, held, stockholder
was holder in due course, and she did not
take note and mortgage subject to any
defenses that corporation or stockholder
might have had against original payee.
Huntington Roller Mills & Mfg. Co. v. Miller
(1922) 60 U 236, 208 P 531.
Bad faith is not established by showing
that altered note was taken. Idaho State
Bank of Twin Falls, Idaho v. Hooper Sugar
Co. (1929) 74 U 24, 276 P 659, 68 ALR 969.
Notice of defects or conditions.
Merely because indorsee of a note for
$2,500 paid $2,100 or $2,300 therefor raises no
presumption of knowledge on his part of
some infirmity in note. Miller v. Marks (1914)
46 U 257,148 P 412.

70A-3-305

Respecting knowledge of defective title to
negotiable instrument, fact that two corporations have-same officers does not necessarily
result in imputation of knowledge of one to
other as subsequent holder, where interests
of two are adverse with respect to instrument; but where one corporation is mere
agent or instrumentality of other, knowledge
is imputable. Utah Bond & Share Co. v.
Chappel (1926) 68 U 530, 251 P 354.
Suspicious circumstances or negligence,
without more, are insufficient to charge purchaser with notice of defect, since actual
knowledge of facts concerning-defect or bad
faith must be shown; but suspicious circumstances may be admitted in evidence as bearing on good faith. National Bank of the
Republic v. Beckstead (1926) 68 U 421, 250 P
1033, overruling in part National Bank of the
Republic v. Price (1923) 65 U 57,234 P 231.

70A-3-305. Rights of a holder in due course. To the extent that a
holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
(a)
infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b)
such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c)
such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential
terms; and
(d)
discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e)
any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he
takes the instrument.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-305.
Cross-References.
Alteration of instrument, 70A-3-407.
Burden of establishing signatures, defenses
and due course, 70A-3-307.
Effect of discharge against holder in due
course, 70A-3-602.
Incomplete instruments, 70A-3-115.
Notice of claim or defense, 70A-3-304 (1)
(b).
Reacquisition of instrument, 70A-3-208.
Rights of one not holder in due course,
70A-3-306.
Transfer, right to indorsement, 70A-3-201.

Recovery by holder of check.
Where the maker of a bank check
attempted to get a shipment of carpet from
payee to him released by the creditor of the
payee through the use of said check, and
after such purpose had been accomplished
the maker sought to renege on his commitment to the payee's creditor by stopping payment on the check, the payee's creditor was
entitled to recover from the maker as a
holder in due course. Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v.
Pappas (1967) 20 U 2d 100, 433 P 2d 605.
Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <8=> 327,363 et seq.
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 301,482 et seq.
11 AmJur 2d 426, 714, 732, 737, Bills and
Notes §§ 398, 652, 666, 690.
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ment. Simpson v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.
(1913) 43 U 105,134 P 883, 46 LRA (NS) 1164,
explained in 103 F 2d 190.
Finance company, as drawer of checks, had
no cause of action against defendant bank, as
drawee, to obtain recredit of drawer's
account for the amount of two checks which
financed the purchase of an auto,-where the
funds represented by the check reached the
intended party, and the plaintiff-finance company received security for the loan it had
made, even though one of the payee names
the finance company placed on the checks
was a nonexistent person, and the indorsement by such person was a forgery.

70A-3-406

Blomquist v. Zions First Nat. Bank (1966) 18
U 2d 65, 415 P 2d 213.
Righto of bona fide holder.
A bona fide holder without notice acquires
no title to a negotiable instrument under a
forged indorsement. The general rules applicable to bona fide holders for value do not
apply in such a case. Warren v. Smith (1909)
35 U 455,100 P 1069,136 Am St Rep 1071.
An action of trover lies without previous
demand and refusal against one who possesses himself improperly of bill stolen from
plaintiff or against one who receives payment
even in good faith of such stolen bill under
forged indorsement. Warren v. Smith (1909)
35 U 455,100 P 1069,136 Am St Rep 1071.

70A-3-405. Impostors — Signature in name of payee.
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is
effective if
(a)
an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the payee; or
(b)
a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer
intends the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c)
an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied
him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of
the person so indorsing.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-405.
Crocs-References.
Signature, authorized representative,
70A-3-401, 70A-3-403.
Unauthorized signature, negligence contributing to, 70A-3-404, 70A-3-406.
Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <S=> 6, 32,182, 279.
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 129,192, 220.
10 AmJur 2d 606-610, Banks §§ 638-640.
Bills and notes: nominal payee rule of UCC
5 3-405 (1) (b), 92 ALR 3d 268.
Construction and application of UCC
13-405 (1) (a) involving issuance of nego-

tiable instrument induced by impostor, 92
ALR 3d 608.
Payee as holder in due course, 2 ALR 3d
1115.
Right of drawee of forged check or draft to
recover amount paid thereon, 12 ALR 1089,
71 ALR 337,121 ALR 1056.
Right of previous holder of check paid by
bank to take advantage of depositor's failure
to examine vouchers, 17 ALR 956.
Who must bear loss as between drawer or
endorser, who delivers check to an impostor
and one who purchases, cashes, or pays it
upon the impostor's endorsement, 22 ALR
1228, 81 ALR 2d 1365.

70A-3-406. Negligence contributing to alteration or unauthorized
signature. Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to
a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who
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pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable
commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-406.
Cross-References.
Alteration of instrument, 70A-3-407.
"Good faith" defined, 70A-1-201 (19).
Signature, how made, 70A-3-401.
"Unauthorized" signature or indorsement
defined, 70A-1-201 (43).
Unauthorized signatures, effect, 70A-3-404.
Collateral References.
Alteration of Instruments <&=> 22; Bills and
Notes <3=> 115, 453.
3A CJS Alteration of Instruments § 80; 10
CJS Bills and Notes § 484.

10 AmJur 2d 589, Banks § 624; 11 AmJur
2d 413, 789, Bills and Notes §§ 386, 710.
Commercial paper: what amounts to
"negligence contributing to alteration or
unauthorized signature" under U. C. C.
§ 3-406, 67 ALR 3d 144.
Negligence in drawing check which facilitates alteration as to amount as affecting
drawee's bank's liability, 42 ALR 2d 1070.
Payee's prior negligence facilitating
forging of endorsement as precluding recovery from bank paying check, 87 ALR 2d 638.

70A-3-407. Alteration.
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any party thereto in any respect, including any such change
in
(a)
the number or relations of the parties; or
(b)
an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than
as authorized; or
(c)
the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any
part of it.
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course
(a)
alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed
unless that party assents or is precluded from asserting the
defense;
(b)
no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument
may be enforced according to its original tenor, or as to
incomplete instruments according to the authority given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the
instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete
instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-407.
Cross-References.
Bank may charge customer's account in
case of altered instrument, 70A-4-401.
Burden of establishing signatures, defenses
and due course, 70A-3-307.
Effect of discharge against holder in due
course, 70A-3-602.
Holder in due course, rights of, 70A-3-305.
Incomplete instruments, 70A-3-115.
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304.
Rights of one not holder in due course,
70A-3-306.

Collateral References.
Alteration of Instruments <$=» 2 et seq.;
Bills and Notes <£=> 378.
3A CJS Alteration of Instruments §5 et
seq.; 10 CJS Bills and Notes § 486.
4 AmJur 2d 6 to 9, Alteration of Instruments §§ 4 to 6; 11 AmJur 2d 108, Bills and
Notes § 78.
Alteration in check or other instrument of
name of branch of bank as material, 174 ALR
299.
Alteration of commercial paper by
reducing the amount, 9 ALR 1087.
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Holder in due course, rights of, 70A-3-302,
70A-3-305.
Notice to purchaser, 70A-3-304.

Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <S=> 383, 440.
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 438 et seq., 510.
11 AmJur 2d 735, Bills and Notes § 670.

70A-3-603. Payment or satisfaction.
(1) The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with
knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument unless
prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim
either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking
the discharge or enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court
of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties. This subsection does not, however,
result in the discharge of the liability
(a)
of a party who in bad faith pays or satisfies a holder who
acquired the instrument by theft or who (unless having the
rights of a holder in due course) holds through one who so
acquired it; or
(b)
of a party (other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank
which is not a depositary bank) who pays or satisfies the
holder of an instrument which has been restrictively
indorsed in a manner not consistent with the terms of such
restrictive indorsement.
(2) Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent of the
holder by any person including a stranger to the instrument Surrender of the instrument to such a person gives him the rights of
a transferee (section 70A-3-201).
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-603.
Cross-References.
Discharge of parties, 70A-3-601.
Impairment of recourse or of collateral,
70A-3-606.
Payment by accommodation party, effect,
70A-3-415 (5).
Reacquisition of instrument by prior party,
70A-3-208.
Restrictive indorsements, 70A-3-205.
Rights of one not holder in due course,
70A-3-306 (d).
Tender of payment, 70A-3-604.
Transfer, right to indorsement, 70A-3-201.
CoUateral References.
Bills and Notes <£» 408, 426 et seq.
10 CJS Bills and Notes § 438 et seq.
11 AmJur 2d 1015, Bills and Notes § 963 et
seq.
Acceptance of renewal note made or
endorsed by personal representative of obli-

gor in original paper as payment or novation
of that paper, 12 ALR 1546.
Accord and satisfaction by endorsement
and transfer of commercial paper by agent
having no authority to compromise, 46 ALR
1523.
Discharge of accommodation maker by
release of mortgage or other security given
for note, 2 ALR 2d 260.
Failure or delay by holder of note to
enforce collateral security as releasing
endorser, surety, or guarantor, 74 ALR 129.
Presumption as to payment or discharge of
obligation from obligor's possession of paper
evidencing it, 156 ALR 777.
Renewal note as discharging original obligation or indebtedness, 52 ALR 1416.
Rights and remedies of accommodation
party to paper as against accommodated
party after payment, 36 ALR 553, 77 ALR
668.
Right to have usurious payments made on
previous obligation applied as payment of
principal on renewal, 13 ALR 1244.
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APPENDIX B

B-1

as checks from Smithfield Livestock Auction to Mr. Erickson;
correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay.

Were those checks all deposited in your

account?
A

That's correct.

Q

All right.

A

I think with the exception that there may have

been a couple at the end that went to Golden Spike, because
he did close his account with us.
Q

How is a check of say a $2,000 amount handled at

Bear River State Bank?

I mean what do you do with it?

When

I deposit a check, what's done with it?
A
$5,000.

Well, we only reviewed the deposits that were over
So these deposits, you know, an officer wouldn't

have seen them.
Q

An officer wouldn't have seen them?

A

No.

Q

But explain the procedure that happened with the

check.
-A

He would have taken it to a teller and she'd have

run it through the work and gone to the computer center.
Q

Do you know what a restrictive endorsement is?

A

Yes.

Q

What is a restrictive endorsement?

A

It means that it can only be cashed by a certain

party or under certain conditions,
Q

Okay.

And what will a teller do when she sees a

restrictive endorsement?
A

She would, you know, see what the restrictions

were and take it to an officer.
Q

Is that the standard practice in your bank?

A

On a restriction, yes.

Q

That is, if I give the bank a restrictive endorse-

ment check, the teller will look at it, as soon as she
identifies it as a restrictive endorsement what is she to do?
A

She's to check and see what the restrictions are,

and if they're met and it's within her check cashing limits,
then she would process it.
check
Q

If it's not—it depends if the

is presented for cash or deposit.
Well, let's say it's entered for just deposit.

Okay?

it.

A

Okay.

Q

A check comes in for $2,000 with a restriction on

For example—correct me, you're the banker—but a

restrictive endorsement such as my signature on this check
waives any mechanic liens against such-and-such a person's
house.
A

Okay.

...^,,*,*^_

Q

And the teller gets that kind of a check. What

1
2
3
4
S

should she do with it?
A

Well, mechanic's liens I think are different than

what we're talking about in this case.
Q

Well, just answer that question.

That is a

restrictive endorsement, isn't it?

6

A

That's correct.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

Well, on a mechanic's lien she would have to see

9

What should she do with that?

the chit that the work had been performed b e f o r e —

10

Q

Would the teller make that decision?

11

A

N o , she wouldn't.

12

Q

She'd take it to an officer?

13

A

That's correct.

14

Q

You've financed car dealerships, haven't you?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And you take liens on cars, don't you?

17

A

That's correct.

18

Q

What if a person buys a car from the car dealer-

19

ship, say Wilson Motor, and the individual puts on that

20

check, "This payment is made in release of any liens or

21

encumbrances on this automobile," and your bank finances

22

Wilson's vehicles and that endorsement comes in.

23

the teller do with tht check?

What shoul4

24

A

I lost y o u r —

25

Q

Wilson Motor Company sometimes finances cars.

They have cars in t h e i r inventory and t h e y ' l l finance them
w i t h , say, Commercial Security Bank? right?
A

Okay.
And an individual writes a check to Wilson Motor,

5

$3,000, for a new car and puts on that check, "This check is

6

payment in full for all liens and encumbranees on automobile /|

7

such-and-such," and then Wilson Motor endorses that check

8

and wants to deposit it in your bank, and you know the bank

9

has a lien on their car.

10

What should the teller do?

Is

that a restrictive endorsement?

11

A

That's correct.

12

Q

What should the teller do?

13

A

Well, I would think she would normally take it to

14

an officer, if you're talking about an automobile for a

15

check that size, she'd take to an officer.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q

Why?

A

For protection.

Q

For protection for who?

A

For the bank.

Q

For the bank.

Because the bank, by accepting that

check, depositing it and then using it, as a collecting
bank may release any lien it has on Wilson's automobile;
right?
A

That's correct.
Let me take the example one step further.

Let's

./

say the hank has a lien on cattle.

Okay?

A

Okay.

Q

And an individual comes in with, a check and this

individual owes the bank money on cattle and the check has
on it, "Payment of this check is release of any and all
liens and encumbrances against the cattle, and if there is
a lien and encumbrance the individual warrants this money
will go to the bank that has the loan, signed William
Erickson.H
What should the teller do with such a check as
that?
A

Like I say, she would look to see who the check is

payable to.
Q

The check is payable to William C. Erickson, and

he signed that endorsement and takes it into your bank and
wants to deposit it.
A

So she would take it and most likely it would go

to the officer and they'd look at it.
Q

What officer would look at it?

A

Generally the operations officer.

Q

Who would that be?

A

In our bank it was Elaine Madsen.

Q

If you saw that kind of an endorsement on a check,

Mr. Yeates, made payable to William C. Erickson from
Smithfield Livestock Auction, what would you do?

Would you

allow that check to be deposited in Mr. Erickson's account
and allow him to draw those funds out?
MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor/ I need to make another
objection outside of our original premise, and that is that
I think his whole line of questioning is calling for a legal
conclusion from the witness based on the legal effect of
endorsement, restrictive endorsement and cashing procedure.
That's all covered by Article 4 of the Code and clearly is
asking for legal conclusions in spite of the fact that itfs
masked as a hypothetical question.
THE COURT: I don't think he's asking him what the
legal conclusion is or what the—I think hels just saying,
"What would you do under those circumstances?"
MR. SHIELDS: Well, I think nonetheless—I can
leave it at that.

It's eliciting the legal effect of an en-

dorsement.
THE COURT:

I don'14ie Office d him that.

I think he

just asked him, "What would you do if the teller brought it
to you?"
MR. DAINES: That's right, Your Honor. First we
establish that a teller—that they have a bank procedure,
what the teller should do, and then who looks at it.
THE COURT: Well, not necessarily what they should
do but generally what they do.
MR. DAINES: That's right.

THE COURT:

1

He's asked you, "What would you do?"

2

A

What was the last question?

3

Q

Well, the last question is:

"If you were brought

4

such a restrictive endorsement, as an officer of the bank

5

would you allow Mr. Erickson to deposit those funds in his

6

checking account and disburse them for whatever purpose he

7

chose?

8

A

Probably not.

9

Q

Would you expect your operations officer to do

10

that?

11
12

A

have any idea that we had a lien on them.

13
14

The operations officer, you know, probably wouldn't)

Q

Well, now wait a minute.

Doesn't the operations

officer know about all of your loans?

15

A

No.

16

Q

Doesn't your operations officer know who the

17

borrowers at the bank are?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Who plugs in these computer things?

20

A

Well, they're two different departments of the

21

bank.

22
23
24
25

Q
sees

Okay.

Well, let's say your operations officer

such a restrictive endorsement.

What should that

individual then do?
A

Well, they would look to see who the check is pay-

able to, because it would be payable to both parties, the
parties that had the restriction as well as the person that
owned the cattle. The check should be payable to both
parties, and so they would look to see, you know, if it's
payable—
Q

What if it's payable to William C. Erickson?

A

Then they would take it where he'd signed it that

there were no encumbrances on it.
Q

Even though the bank has an encumbrance?

A

Well, the operations officer would have no idea

that the bank had an encumbrance.
Q

You do, but the operations officer doesn't?

A

That's correct.

Q

Now, Mr. Yeates, how big a bank is Bear River

State 3ank?
A

At that time it was about a little over a $20

million bank.
Q

How many employees?

A

Over twenty.

Q

How many officers?

A

Five.

Q

Were you one of the officers?

A

Yes.

Q

And you're telling me that in a bank of five

officers that the operations officer doesn't know who owes

the bank money?
A

That's correct. Because of the sheer size.

Q

Pardon me?

A

Because of the sheer size of the bank.

Q

I want you to take a look at one of those checks

of Smithfield Livestock Auction, Mr. Yeates. Have you got
it?
A

Yes.

Q

I want you to look at the back of it and read the

restrictive endorsement.

First tell me if that is a

restrictive endorsement.
A

Yes.

Q

What does it say?

A

Have you got a magnifying glass?

Thank you.

"In executing my endorsement of this check, I do sell to
the Smithfield Livestock Auction, Incorporated, the herein
described livestock, and I guarantee that I am the owner of
said livestock and that said livestock are clear of all
mortgages, liens, or encumbrances. If livestock are mortgaged, mortgagee's endorsement or release of mortgage is
required.
Q

Please endorse below."
Okay.

Does that endorsement require an endorse-

ment by the bank in order to take those funds, Mr. Yeates?
Is it a restrictive endorsement?
A

Yes.

Q

Whose signatures are required to endorse that

check?
A

The payee,

Q

Oh? Who does it say is required to endorse those

checks?
A

Well, it says—let's read it again.

"In executing

my endorsement of this check"—see, the person it's payable
to—
Q

Read the second sentence, Mr. Yeates.

A

Okay.

Q

Read the second part that pertains to the mortgagee

It's only one sentence.

Who is the mortgagee anyway?
A

Is it the bank?

Well, it would have to be named on the front of the

check/ otherwise no one would have any knowledge.
Q

Well, you knew who was the mortgagee of these

cattle.
A

No one else would.

Q

Just you?

A

Just the lending institution.

Q

Okay. And you're the one that's getting the check,

with the restrictive endorsement on?
A

But it's a different department of the bank.

Q

Okay, it's a different department. Read us the

second part. What does it say where it discusses what is
required from the mortgagee?

1

A

See if I can find a better copy here. Let's see.

2

»i am the owner of said livestock and that said livestock

3

are clear of all mortgages, liens, or encumbrances."

4

I guess maybe there was a period there. Okay.

5

"if livestock are mortgaged, mortgagee's endorsement or

6

release of mortgage is required."

7

Q

N O W let's just assume for a moment that these are

8

the cows that you've got in your security agreement. Who is

9

required to sign that check by the terms of that restrictive

10

endorsement, Mr. Yeates?

11

MR. SHIELD: Your Honor, at this point the docu-

12

ment. speaks for itself. We have a document in evidence and

13

it's its own—

14
15

MR. DAINES: I think we're entitled to inquire,
Your Honor.

18
17

THE COURT: Well, are you asking him who is
required or who—

18

MR. DAINES: Pursuant to the terms of that.

19

THE COURT: — o r who he would think has—

20

MR. DAINES: Well, the terms of the restrictive

21

J endorsement. Do you claim a mortgage on cattle, Mr. Yeates?

22

A

Pardon?

23

Q

Do you claim a mortgage on Mr. Erickson's cattle?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Are you a mortgagee?

A

That's correct.

Q

Would that endorsement require your signature for

negotiation of that check?
A

No one would know unless we were named as a joint

payee•
Q

Well, you know you're the mortgagee.

A

But what if he took the check someplace else to

deposit it or cash it?
Q

What if he did?

But he didn't, did he?

A

He could have done.

Q

But he didn't. He took it to your own bank,

didn't he?
A

No. Like I say', there were some that were deposited]

at Golden Spike.
Q

There was one; right?
MR. SHIELDS: I make a relevancy objection here,

not on our previous discussion.
THE COURT: Yeah.

I'll sustain the objection,

because you're asking him to admit they'd have to endorse
it.

You can ask him what he thinks this does.
Q

Is it a restrictive endorsement, Mr. Yeates?

A

Yes.

Q

All right.
MR. SHIELDS: Excuse me, Your Honor. If I could

just follow up on that briefly.

The problem is the law is

very clear that a check needs only to be endorsed by the
payee. Now, I'm going to make an objection based on that
and with, that legal—with that statute in the State of Utah
the remainder becomes irrelevant*
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, that's absolutely wrong.
A restrictive endorsement is just that. The check can only
be negotiated by complying with the restrictions, which is
what Mr. Yeates told us. That's what a restrictive endorsement is.
THE COURT: I'm having the same problem that you
had av/hile back and that Mr. Yeates has, and that is I can't
really—
MR. DAINES: You know what it says.

I'll have

him present it on the board over here. Will you do that?
I'll give you a check and you can do that. I'll submit
this and I think we can stipulate to that, Your Honor, is
that it's a heck of a lot more clear on the check itself.
We don't have one of those checks, do we?
FROM THE COURTROOM: No.
THE COURT: If you've got one that's fairly
clear, we can send it out and I'll have my secretary type
it out.
MR. DAINES: Okay.

Should we take a recess for

five minutes and have that done, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, Because I'm not sure exactly
what that says.

I've got a different idea and you have a

different idea and Mr. Shields has a different idea and
Mr. Yeates has a different idea. We have four different
ideas of what it's saying, at least from what I got out of
it, but if we can take that and have it printed so we can
all read it, we'll do that.
CCourt recessed for about ten minutes.
Following the recess:)
THE COURT: Does this look like what it says?
MR. DAINES: Yeah.

Do you have a copy too, Your

Honor?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. DAINES: I guess we only have three copies.
May I borrow yours, Counsel?
MR. SHIELDS: You bet.
MR. DAINES: Your copy or mine or whatever.
Q

CBy Mr. Daines of Mr. Yeates).

Mr. Yeates, I'm

directing your attention to the last sentence of that
restrictive endorsement.

First of all can you identify

that as a restrictive endorsement?
A

Yes.

Q

Now what are the terms of handling restrictive

endorsements in order to endorse and cash the check?
one need to comply with the restrictive endorsement?

Does

1

A

That's correct.

2

Q

And anyone who accepts a check where the restric-

3

tive endorsement is not complied with will be liable for the

4

amount of that check; is that correct?

5

M R . SHIELDS: That is a legal conclusion.

6

MR. DAINES:

7

officer's knowledge, Your Honor.

8
9

But it's a conclusion within a bank

THE COURT:
question.

10

I'm not sure that I understand your

You're saying that the person who endorses i t —
MR. DAINES:

Receives a check improperly endorsed

11

is responsible for cashing the check and can be liable for

12

those funds*

13

Q

Is it a restrictive endorsement, Mr. Yeates?

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q

who guarantees an endorsement when it's passed on

I'll go through it step by step.

to the receiving bank?
17

18
19

Does the collecting bank guarantee

| the endorsement?
A

It goes back to the most—to the previous endorse-

20

ment , I think.
Q
I understand what you're saying.

21

check is forged.

But let's say a

22

A

Okay.

23

Q

And the forger brings it into a bank and the bank

24

pays out the funds on that forged check and then the b a n k —

25

and that's called the collecting bank—send it on to a

1

' receiving bank; right?

2

I

A

Okay.

3

|

Q

That then disburses money out of that person's

4

account.

5

Is the receiving bank then entitled to back charge

the collecting bank?

6
7
8 |
9

A

The receiving is the bank on which it's drawn?

Q

Yes.

A

Okay.

So the answer to your question would be

the collecting bank.

10

Q

11

That's right.

And the collecting bank is

responsible if it can't catch the forger; right?

12

I

A

That's c o r r e c t .

13

'

Q

And you know that because t h a t ' s the way t h i n g s

14

are handled?

15

A

That's right.

16

Q

Is the same true also of endorsements that are

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

restrictive?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

So the collecting bank has to guarantee

endorsements, doesn't it?
A

That's correct.

Q

Who was the collecting bank on all of these

Smithfield Livestock Auction checks?
A

Most of them, Bear River State Bank.

Q

With the exception of one of them it was 3ear

-DZ-

River State Bank; isn't that right?
A

That's correct.

Q

So did the Bear River State Bank guarantee these

endorsements, that the restriction had been complied with?
A

Yes.

Q

That's how it's handled in the normal channels of

commerce?
A

That's correct.

Q

Now I want to call your attention to the last

sentence of the endorsement.

It says, "If livestock are

mortgaged, mortgagee's endorsement or release of mortgage is
required."

What is an endorsement?

A

It's signing the check.

Q

Signing the check.

Do any of these checks bear—

well, first of all, do you claim the livestock are mortgaged?
A

Yes.

Q

Is Commercial Security Bank's endorsement required

on that check?
A

No. The check only requires the endorsement of

the payees.
Q

No, I want to ask you, doesn't the restriction

require the mortgagee's endorsement?
A

But there would be no way of knowing who the

mortgagee is unless they're named as a payee also.

Q

Unless the collecting bank happened to be the

mortgagee. Then it would know, wouldn't it?
A

Nof it would not necessarily know.

Q

You're saying that within a big bank one hand

doesn't know what the other hand does?
A

That's correct.

Q

But has the restriction in this case been complied •

with?
A

As far as the world is concerned, yes.

O

No, as far as this endorsement, it requires your

endorsement on the check, doesn't it?
A

No, it doesn't, because we're not named as the.

payee.
Q

But you've told us you have to comply with a

restrictive endorsement.
A

That's correct.

Q

Then your bank is responsible to see that you do

comply with it; right?
A

That's correct.

Q

Okay. Now I submit to you it would be a different

case if it was Golden Spike Bank, but your tellers and your
operations officer didn't have to go far to find out whether
those cattle were mortgaged, did they?
A

Yes.

Q

Eow far would they have to go?

1

A

They have no idea what's going on in the lending—

2

Q

They had no idea William C. Erickson had a loan

3

I with you?

4

A

That's correct.

5

Q

No idea whatsoever?

6

A

I feel safe in saying that.

7

Q

How difficult would it have been to inquire?

8

A

Very.

Q

You mean they would have had to walk across the

9

I

10

As busy as they are.

room and ask you?

11

A

Itls not in the normal course of business to do it.

12

I

Q

Could they have found out by asking you?

13

I

A

They could, but tfiey would have no reason to.

14

Q

You agree that the endorsement has not been com-

15

plied with?

16

A

No, I say the endorsement has been complied with.

17

Q

Mr. Yeates, did you ever, by March or April of

18
19

1983, were you aware that Mr. Erickson had sold some of his
livestock?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

I don't know what he told you.

22
23
24
25

He told me he'd liquidated the whole herd.
I just asked, are

you aware of that?
* A

Yes.

Q

Were you aware of where they had he.en sold through^

A

Not at that point, no.

